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Unemployment cannot be conquered by a democracy until it is understood. Full productive
employment in a free society is possible but it is not possible without taking pains. It cannot
be won by waving a financial wand; it is a goal that can be reached only by conscious
continuous organization of all our productive resources under democratic control. To win
full employment and keep it, we must will the end and must understand and will the means.
(William Beveridge 1945, p. 16)
Introduction
Writing in the 1940s, Beveridge thought that full employment would be achieved when the number of job
vacancies would be higher than the number of jobless (Beveridge 1945) a condition that would guarantee
no long-term unemployment. What Beveridge envisaged was achieved in the immediate post-war years,
but, alas, was not sustained during the past two or even three decades. Unlike the past three decades,
however, the U.S. economy appears to currently have reached full-employment with low and stable
inflation. Low unemployment rates as conventionally measured, cannot tell the entire unemployment
story. The Bureau of Labor Statistics regularly reports that the flows among the categories 'officially
unemployed', 'employed', and 'out-of-the-labor-force' are very large. In November 1998, for example, of
those unemployed, 45% were job losers, 10.7% were job leavers, and 44.3% came from
out-the-labor-force. Those who find jobs typically come from the out-the-labor-force category. Of the
68 million people in this category, 4.21 million wanted a job and only 1.2 million of them indicated a
marginal attachment to the labor force and were not currently working; the rest had no attachment to
the labor force. As Lester Thurow notes (1996), there are a few more million missing males who used to
be in the workforce, who are not in school, are not old enough to have retired, and are neither employed
nor unemployed. They have either dropped from, or dropped out of, the GNP machine of the United
States. Thus, the 4.4% unemployment rate reported for November 1998 does not represent the true
unemployment level for the U.S.. The unemployment landscape would look even more different if
adjustments were made for the large number of the "employed" who are involuntarily working part-time
(almost 3.3 million in November 1998) and who for statistical purposes are not differentiated from
those working on full-time, year-round basis. While it is not possible to calculate how many more
individuals could work if jobs were made available, there undoubtedly exist millions of potential workers.
Finally, to make matters worse, the unemployment rate is underestimated, if the concept of "disguised"
unemployment (defined as low productivity employment as compared to manufacturing productivity) is
to be applied, since by and large, employment growth is not in the manufacturing sectors, but in services
whose productivity lags that in manufacturing (Robinson 1937; Eatwell 1995).
This state of affairs coincides not only with the rush to deficit reduction embraced by the American,
European, and Asian economies, but also with the implementation of a 'welfare reform' in the U.S. that
seeks to force recipients off assistance through setting time (and other) limits on eligibility. This policy
leaves it to individual states to try to find jobs for former beneficiaries, a task that they are unable
-even if they were willing- to shoulder. A recent survey in New York State, for example, showed that
cutting off aid will not necessarily put people to work. Imprecise as the survey may be, it still showed
that a large proportion (two-thirds) of the individuals leaving the rolls of the Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Home Relief programs failed to get jobs ( The NY Times , 23 March 1998,pp. 1, B6). These individuals were left without the means to provide for themselves and their families,
thereby driving them deeper into poverty rather than self-sufficiency. This is in concert with the
strategy enforced by the current political infrastructure that aims to progressively dismantle the public
sector social safety net that traditionally had protected the most vulnerable segments of the population
against economic and other hardships. 
A similar employment situation prevails in Europe, where central banks continue a policy of tight money
even while many countries--within and outside the European Union (EU)-experience double digit official
unemployment rates. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have all had unemployment rates over
10% (Germany's October 1998 rate was over 10%, while Spain's has averaged closer to 20% for over two
years), and are projecting similar rates through the year 2002. At the same time, EU member states
are preparing to give up their sovereignty to conduct coordinated fiscal and monetary policy by
accepting the rules of a flawed European Monetary Union (EMU). The Maastricht accord sets ceilings for
inflation and government deficits and debt, but not for unemployment, which, as of the end of October
1998 stood at 16.8 million individuals for the fifteen member-states. When asked about remedies to
ameliorate high unemployment rates EU economics ministers respond about a type of progress identified
as 'change in trend but not yet of a breakthrough' (Financial Times, 12 March 1998).
During the Great Depression, unemployment was addressed through interventionist government. These
government programs were temporary, however, and with the economic recovery that accompanied U.S.
entry into WW II, they were discontinued. In the Post-War era, promotion of "full" or "maximum"
employment meant macroeconomic policies designed to manage aggregate demand, supplemented by
selective programs, such as job training and limited income maintenance. With the onset of the 1970s
stagflation, however, even the moderate approach of demand management faltered and led to a
consensus among economists and policy makers that a "natural rate" of unemployment, or NAIRU, of 5
percent in the U.S. and as high as 10 percent in France, for example, would be too inflationary. This
received wisdom continues to this day, so as to ensure price stability, results in millions of individuals
--of the order that was mentioned earlier-- who are ready, willing, and able to work, remain idle, thereby
serving as a "reserve" or "forgotten army" of labor. Two important questions, then, may be posed
regarding unemployment. First, is this the best we can do at times of prosperity? Second, are we
prepared to meet the challenges of the next downturn? (Worrisome signs have already appeared: equity
and bond markets volatility in the U.S. and overseas, the Asian and Russian crises, unprecedented rates
of household and business indebtedness in the U.S., and an obsession for meeting government budget
deficit reduction targets everywhere.)
Employment Policy Options
The challenge that policymakers confront is to craft employment policies that (i) uphold the basic human
right to a job that neither interferes with micro-decisions of individual firms nor relies on the failed
approach of 'fine-tuning' aggregate demand, and (ii) are not inflationary. The policy also should be
consistent with the fundamental premise that to the extent possible, socially-productive work is
preferable to income maintenance. This would necessarily call for bold initiatives, and it has been
recognized as such by a number of scholars across the theoretical and political spectrum. Many
measures have been suggested. This paper analyzes those which, as of late, have received substantial
currency, and are presently proposed as viable options to achieving higher employment. These include:
reduction of the workweek, employment subsidies, and public service employment or the government
becoming the employer of last resort (ELR). 
Reduction of the workweek 
Reducing the workweek or sharing available work has been introduced many times by governments and
trade unions alike as, first, a mechanism to ameliorate high unemployment, and second, to provide
flexibility and power sharing in the workplace. Work-sharing arrangements are not strictly limited to
reducing the normal workweek, but also include other schemes, i.e., job-sharing or job splitting,
elimination of overtime, phased-in retirement, phased entry through extended education and training,
and in general working part-time. Working part-time was promoted in the OECD Jobs Study (1995) as a
measure to increase flexibility that "could enhance job creation and employment prospects" (p. 23).The principal argument made for implementing work-sharing arrangements is that they "redistribute
work over people so as to reduce the extent of involuntary unemployment" (Dreze 1986, p. 1). Similarly,
the Commission of the European Communities (EU) endorsed the measure 20 years ago; as they put it, 
the aim of work-sharing is to redistribute the total volume of work in the economy in order
to increase employment opportunities for all those wishing to work. This does not mean
that the volume of work remains constant. Rather it is based on the observation that this
volume is at present inadequate and that we must try to redistribute it (CEC 1978, p. 2).
The European Union renewed its endorsement to this employment strategy by incorporating it in the
Working Time Directive issued in 1993 (European Industrial Relations Review 1993). The trading of hours
for jobs scheme that results from the reduction of the normal workweek has been desirable to both
employers and employees for different reasons. Employees' desires are based on what may be called the
"sovereignty of time", while the employers' desires reflect changes in production schedules and product
demand, and the implementation of new technology.
As Europe's unemployment rates have remained at record levels, trading hours for jobs has reappeared
as a viable employment policy. This approach to employment has been favored by trade unions. In
Germany, however, reductions in the normal workweek were implemented in the 1950s and 1960s with
no apparent increase in employment but did establish a new normal workweek (Hinrichs 1991). Germany's
economics minister, Gunter Rexrodt, has suggested that saving jobs will require shorter hours and longer
holidays. Volkswagen has pushed hard for the tradeoff of a four-day workweek with a 20% wage cut or
massive layoffs (Gow 1993; The Economist,  13 November 1993). This kind of employment policy
resembles the "shock therapy" applied to Russia and the former Warsaw Pact economies, during
transition, the abysmal results of which have been documented (Papadimitriou 1991).
Other examples of implementing such policies abound. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Netherlands
experienced high unemployment along with an increase in the labor force, which led them, in 1982 to
experiment with a reduced workweek and forfeiture of pay increases. Research studies that attempted
to quantify the impact of the experiment on employment growth showed no significant changes
occurred, and thus indicated that reducing the workweek was "a relatively ineffective policy for reducing
unemployment" (Roche, Fynes, and Morrissey 1996, p. 136). The experiences with reduced working hours
schemes in Belgium in the 1980s, and in Australia in the 1970s and 1980s, when unemployment rose,
further support the argument that no growth in employment occurs (pp. 137-9). To the contrary, in the
case of Australia it has been shown that reduction in working hours may lead to increased overtime
costs, which result in a decrease of employment (Dixon 1987).
In the United States, reduction in working hours has not been used as a strategy to increase
employment. Juliet Schor in The Overworked American (1991) reported that Americans worked 1,924
hours in 1989 compared with 1,786 hours two decades earlier, an increase of 7.7 percent. She suggests
that reducing the 40-hour workweek would lead to less absenteeism, less turnover, less personal
business on company time, lower costs, and, perhaps, increased employment. As unemployment rose in
the 1970s and 1980s, some labor economists and others advocated shorter workweeks to "spread the
work," arguing that reducing the standard workweek would put millions of individuals to work (Levitan and
Belous 1977; Morand and Macoy 1984; McGaughey 1981). In the U.S., what has been seen instead is that
many employers and consenting employees have increased the workweek through overtime as a means
to decrease costs (employers do not pay benefits on overtime work) and, increase income for employees
in an environment of job insecurity. This phenomenon has amounted to such considerable debate involving
so many aspects of employment and work hours that many question the official statistics on
unemployment rates (Bluestone and Rose 1998). 
Chart 1 shows the trend of average weekly hours worked for prime-age workers since 1975 (p. 34).
During the last two recoveries -1982 to 1989 and 1992 to 1995- average weekly hours increased
significantly without a pronounced change in the number of prime-age workers, which clearly indicates achange in the labor supply regime, and provides an explanation of the reasons for low unemployment and
low inflation we have experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. In simple arithmetic terms, if the employed
labor force were about 100 million in 1982, the increase in hours is calculated to be the equivalent of 3.7
million additional workers, or a decrease of the official unemployment rate by 3.7 percent (ibid, p. 35). 
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The Japanese experience with shorter working hours has been scanty. Until recently Japan's official
unemployment rates have been significantly low, thus negating any interest in full employment policy. As
Deutschmann (1991) put it, Japanese human resource practices are associated with a larger number of
normal work hours, a lot of overtime, and fewer paid holidays than other industrial countries; moreover,
there is no clear separation between time devoted to leisure and to work. During the 1990s, some
significant reductions in working time have been implemented. The likely employment effects of shorter
working hours have been simulated by using a simple model (Brunello 1989). The econometric results of
this model show the outcome of a reduction of the workweek to be associated with an increase in
overtime and reduction in employment.
Finally, the experience in France is perhaps the most interesting since there is a national belief derived
from opinion polls and shared across the political spectrum, that shortening the workweek will lead to
employment creation (ILO 1993). The working time policies in France have been detailed in Jallade (1991)
who, contrary to the sentiment of the general public, argued that no significant employment effects
were discernible from the 1980s reductions in the workweek, and if there were any, they were most
likely offset by the decline in the French economy's competitiveness resulting from increased wage
costs. Furthermore, he suggests that advocating the spreading of the work by means of reducing work
hours may not lead to additional jobs, but, rather, to a faster pace of the workers and higher
productivity. The latest attempt of Prime Minister Jospin to reduce the workweek to 35 hours as a
macroeconomic policy for job creation met strong criticism by economists and trade unions alike. Francehas gone ahead and instituted the 35 hour workweek, the objections and criticisms notwithstanding.
Early reports indicate not only insignificant reductions in the ranks of unemployed , but projections of
higher unit costs.
The work-leisure allocation is important in our lives and economy, and it could be argued that reducing
the workweek will solve a number of social problems and alleviate many personal concerns. Reducing
work-hours to generate employment has, from the European experience, shown not only to have failed to
enlarge the pool of employed workers, but also to have resulted in a number of negative side effects,
i.e., loss of output, inflation and imbalance of trade. Moreover, instituting working time reductions during
periods of persistently high unemployment may become permanent, adversely effecting individual
preferences for more income than more leisure (Owen 1989, p. 141). Even though some share of
unemployment is due to the business cycle, a significant number of individuals are chronically
unemployed. In Europe and the United States reported statistics on unemployment mask the true story.
As it was mentioned earlier, jobless rates do not distinguish between those who are involuntarily
employed part-time; year-round, full-time workers; discouraged workers; and those who are not part of
the official labor force. All individuals who are able and willing to work cannot be employed by spreading
the work of those who are employed. This would be, to use a musical analogy, as if a string quartet had
five players. There is, instead, a level of structural unemployment causing enormous social and economic
costs; to deal with this unemployment adequately requires not rationing work, but a radical change in the
institutional arrangements that presently guide economic and political thinking. These changes include
activist governments fostering increases in the demand for labor that lead to further employment
emanating from increases in effective demand. To these options, we turn next.
Employment subsidies 
In a series of articles culminating in a recent highly acclaimed book, Edmund Phelps of Columbia
University has proposed subsidizing the employment of low-wage, lower-skilled workers (1994a, 1994b,
1997). Aside from ethical considerations that a wage be fair, an employment subsidy may become, he
contends, the impetus of higher levels of employment from the ranks of unemployed and those not
presently in the labor force. Wage subsidies were first proposed by Pigou (1933), Kaldor (1936),
Jackman and Layard (1986), and Snower (1993) all in Britain, and in the United States by Hammermesh
(1978), Haveman and Palmer (1982), Phelps, and many others. 
Employment subsidy schemes that require the cost to firms of employing additional workers be partially
offset by public purse payments to the employer gained considerable currency as a means to counter
economic contraction and high unemployment (i.e., in the 1930s and 1970s), and for lifting or
"rewarding" low-wage workers. However, as Phelps points out, when the Keynesian notion of insufficient
effective demand caused by monetary and fiscal policies won the argument of how to deal with
unemployment, "wage subsidies fell out of fashion, if not into disrepute. Then, when economists
concluded that the usual monetary maladjustment works itself out --that unemployment tends toward
its current 'natural' level through wage adjustments or the traditional behavior of the central bank-- the
way was clear for a return of the idea of employment subsidies" (Phelps 1997, p. 144). The case has
also been made that wage subsidies to employers can impact not only those directly effected, but
others who are dependent on them (children) as well as the wider community, i.e., challenging
disadvantaged workers or those who are involuntarily not in the labor force to be susceptible to
opportunities of crime and other illegal activity (Phelps 1994b, p. 57). Furthermore, low wages in
general, are a disincentive for the unskilled to seek employment, and to rely instead on benefits and
entitlements afforded by the safety net (ibid). 
To be sure, subsidies for rewarding work exist and the evidence for being successful is mixed. The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), for example, has been criticized for many reasons: (i) being vulnerable
to abuse since it does not take into account nonwage income, (ii) it is directed mainly to heads of
households and neglects many poor, single workers, (iii) it intervenes in labor markets by depressing
wages, and (iv) provides the least incentive to work to those whose job commitment is the weakest,
since the potential benefits for them are very low (Phelps 1997). These criticisms notwithstanding,
many commentators have urged that it be expanded to boost poorly paid work (Bluestone and Ghilarducci1996). Another form of subsidy is the "negative income tax," which benefits every individual regardless
of employment. However, such a tax works more to alleviate the problem of redistribution than to
maximize employment (Tobin 1966, 1967). There is, by and large, a general agreement that neither the
EITC nor the negative income tax provide inducements for employment growth or incentives to hold onto
a job to the same extent that a wage subsidy would pull from the unemployed, non-employed or welfare
rolls. Phelps estimates that the initial cost of his proposed plan of a "graduating" employment subsidy
-the subsidy decreases as the wage increases-- would be about $98 billion, if it were to be in place in
1990 as indicated in Table 1 (1997, p. 175). In 1997, the estimate goes up to $125 billion reflecting
inflationary increases in money wages and the resulting increased employment over the 1990-1997
period (Phelps, p. 116). Phelps is not concerned with the cost of his proposal, however, since a small
increase in the payroll tax, which he calculates at 2.5 percent, can finance it. 
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Phelps' plan has had a fair number of criticisms that have focused on the general issue of the
effectiveness of subsidies, since it is possible that employers will seek to substitute subsidized workers
for those currently employed. If the plan is successful in promoting higher levels of private sector
employment, as assumed, it also is likely to result in upward pressure on money wages, which would lead
to inflation and add to rigidities in the economic system that hinder expansion. Furthermore, even though
Phelps refers to his scheme as a "market-based approach," the plan entails significant interference with
employer decisions, thereby distorting the market mechanism. There is a question whether a firm's
behavior will become directed toward obtaining the subsidy, rather than to the market to obtain profits.
Phelps argues these criticisms away by distinguishing "private" from "social" productivity and, thus, the
"free-market" from "social" prices of labor, which give rise to the distinction of private versus social
costs, and then, to higher prices. This is no different, he contends, than Marshall's and Pigou's
recognition that even in competitive markets there are many instances of a "free-market" price
diverging from the "right" price. He insists his plan is based "on the view that judicious subsidies are
acceptable..... as long as the system of free enterprise is kept firmly in place" and "if low-wage workers
become better rewarded, a more adventurous and less bridled capitalism might well be justified" (1997,
p. 123). In the end, what can be said is that subsidized low-wage labor schemes, despite their high price
tag, may not guarantee full-employment. 
Government as Employer of Last Resort (ELR)
Hyman P. Minsky (1986) was skeptical of employment policies based on subsidies because he believed
such policies were liable to lead to inflation, financial crisis, and serious instability. Instead, Minsky
proposed an alternative employment strategy, which he called an "employer of last resort" (ELR) policy,
in which government provides a job guarantee. He felt such plan would promote full employment without
the inflationary pressures and structural rigidities usually associated with economies operating at full
employment. Minsky was not alone in advocating the government's role as the employer of last resort.
Others, including Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) suggested that non-targeted public employment
may lead to a net gain in total employment even though, in their view, the taxes needed to finance such
public employment must be absorbed by labor. And recently, Robert Solow (1998) urged the creation of
a public employment program for former welfare recipients. Minsky's proposal has been developed in
considerable detail by a group of researchers at the Levy Institute (Wray 1997, Forstater 1997)
providing even greater theoretical support for a government guaranteed job assurance.
The first component of the proposal would be relatively simple. The government as employer of last
resort would announce the wage at which it will offer employment to anyone who wants to work in the
public sector, and then would employ all who want to work at that wage. Normal public sector
employment will not be affected by this job guaranteed plan, but will remain a vital and separate
component of public employment. Under this program, the government would become in a sense "amarket maker for labor" by establishing a "buffer stock of labor" as it would stand ready to "buy" all
unemployed labor at a fixed price (wage), or to "sell" that is, provide it to the private sector at a higher
price (wage). As is the case in all buffer stock schemes, the commodity used as a buffer stock is always
fully employed. It always has a very stable price, which cannot deviate much from the range established
by the government's announced "buy" and "sell" price. This feature of the proposal ensures full
employment with stable prices. The buffer stock aspects of this job guaranteed program generate
"loose" labor markets even as they ensure full employment. This stands in stark contrast with Keynesian
demand management policies that were designed to "prime the pump" with government spending that
would increase private demand sufficient to lower unemployment to the full employment level. The
danger was that the Keynesian policies would lead to tight labor markets and that inflation would be
generated long before reaching full employment. The program entailing a "public service employment"
strategy would operate through increases or decreases to the buffer stock of labor, rather than
causing unemployment. (If the buffer stock of labor shrinks in an expansion causing pressures on
inflation, government raises taxes or reduces spending to replenish the buffer stock.)
This program can eliminate all involuntary unemployment by providing jobs for every person ready,
willing, and able to work. There will still exist many individuals -even those in the labor force- who will be
voluntarily unemployed, unwilling to work for the government, unwilling to work for the government's
predetermined wage, would not meet the minimum standards for such employment, or would rather look
for a better job while unemployed. But any person willing and able to work -able defined very broadly as
virtually all Americans who can contribute to the economy and society, irrespective of the size of the
contribution- will have the opportunity to do so. 
The implication of the program is that much social spending that is currently targeted to the unemployed
can be discontinued or eliminated altogether. Unemployment compensation is one example that provides
some income for some of the unemployed. Guaranteed "public service employment" will render
unemployment compensation unnecessary since coverage would be conceivably universal; no one would be
paid for not working, and pay would be equalized. Moreover, some other forms of social spending, i.e.,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and Food
Stamps, could be substantially reduced. A public service guarantee program cannot substitute all social
support since many individuals currently receiving such assistance are not and probably could not be in
the labor force. Precisely, who would be forced out of these current programs and into the "public
service employment" plan outlined here, cannot be easily determined. However, unlike welfare-to-work
schemes, this employment program is voluntary, ensures a job is available, and has no lifetime limit.
Taking the current number of unemployed, as well as the cost of various programs that would be either
reduced or eliminated and projecting the cost of the job guaranteed policy and potential savings, it has
been calculated that the net cost to the government could be as high as $50 billion (Wray 1997).
Obviously, the budgetary effects of such a policy are quite small relative to the size of the federal
budget, to the size of the U.S. GDP machine, and to the size of this year's actual federal budget surplus
(and those projected well into the future). Moreover, this estimate does not include any indirect benefits
likely to redound from this policy, such as those resulting from decreases in the social costs of
unemployment, i.e., decreased criminal activity, physical and mental health problems, and the benefits of
some public sector projects, such as those relating to environmental protection, and improvements in
the physical condition of the cities and the country as a whole.
Many questions can be raised in connection with a "public service employment" program. Is full
employment going to increase aggregate demand to the level that accelerating demand-pull inflation
would follow? Can aggregate demand increase to the level at which the additional federal budget spending
will not generate inflation? The answers to these questions seem clear. If in the absence of a guaranteed
public service employment policy, public and private sector spending provides a level of employment that
leaves more than 6 million workers unemployed and more than 3 million underemployed, this must be
evidence that aggregate demand is too low. For if it were higher, the population would be spending more
and creating more jobs for the unemployed. Indeed, existence of involuntarily unemployed workers is de
facto  evidence that aggregate demand is below the level required for full employment. Thus, additional
government spending that increases employment is indicative of aggregate demand being below the fullemployment level. The "public service employment program" can be designed to ensure that additional
federal spending will rise only to the point at which all involuntary employment is eliminated. Once there
are no workers willing to accept a guaranteed job, spending will not be increased further; the program
therefore ensures that spending does not become "excessive," that is, it will not cause aggregate
demand to increase beyond the full employment level. Fine-tuning aggregate demand is still possible with
the adoption of this policy, since increases in demand will cause the guaranteed job pool to shrink, while
decreases will result in its expansion. This policy limits spending to the level that will guarantee true full
employment, thereby alleviating concern about demand-pull inflation. 
What about cost-push inflation resulting from the pressure on wages and in turn costs and prices? The
wage paid by the government for the public service employment program is exogenously set, stable, and
sets a benchmark price for labor. Although some jobs might still pay a wage below the program's wage
-for example, for work that is more pleasurable- once the program is put in place, most of the low-wage
jobs will experience a one-time increase in wages or may disappear altogether. Employers will be forced
to cover these higher costs through a combination of higher product prices, greater labor productivity,
and lower realized profits. Some product prices, therefore, would experience a one-time increase, but
this phenomenon is not inflation, nor can it be accelerating inflation as these terms are normally defined
by economists.
Recent literature places a high rate to and in turn, a high cost for depreciation on idle human capital:
Labor productivity falls quickly when labor is unemployed, and beyond some point, labor probably
becomes unemployable because of loss of "work habit". With a "public service employment" policy those
who are not employed in the private sector continue to work, and, in turn, skills will not depreciate so
quickly. Indeed, social policy could be geared toward enhancing the human capital of the guaranteed job
pool which, in turn, would reduce the productivity-adjusted cost of hiring out of this pool relative to
unemployed workers, and thereby diminish inflationary pressures. 
It is, therefore, not clear that this type of full employment policy will be inflationary in the sense of
generating continuous pressure on wages and prices. Wages might experience a one-time increase
because of the, say $12,500 plus mark up to annual labor costs (calculated at $6.00 per work/hour for
2080 hours per year) required to hire unemployed workers. And workers of higher productivity might
become more obstinate in their wage demands, so that other wages also ratchet upward. However,
against this tendency is the likelihood that the public service employment program will reduce the
erosion of human capital, and possibly will develop or maintain the human capital of workers who are
temporarily unneeded in the private sector. When demand for private output rises sufficiently for these
workers to be hired in the private sector, the somewhat higher cost of workers in the program relative
to the cost of unemployed workers in the absence of the program is somewhat offset by higher
productivity, thereby reducing any pressure on prices. Moreover, because unemployment compensation
may no longer be needed, there would be no need for experience-rated unemployment insurance taxes on
firms and workers. That is, those firms that typically have volatile (seasonal or cyclical) demand for
labor would experience a reduction in overall labor costs, which, again, would tend to offset some of the
higher wage costs. By and large, even the one-time upward adjustment in wages and prices might be
quite small.
It is difficult to see why true full employment under a public service job opportunity program could be
more inflationary than the current system, which pays people for not working, allows their human capital
to depreciate, and results in high economic and social costs associated with unemployment. In addition,
income maintenance programs increase aggregate demand without increasing aggregate supply, while
this employment program increases both aggregate supply and aggregate demand, which puts less
pressure on prices.
Even if successful at substantially increasing employment, programs calling either for a wage subsidy or
reductions in the workweek could result in the inflation and sluggish growth associated with tight labor
markets and structural rigidities. In contrast, a public service employment solution could provide a full
employment policy that retains price stability and labor market flexibility. Such an approach also will berelatively inexpensive and is likely to pay for itself. Public sector employment will preserve and could
even enhance the productivity of the "reserve pool" of guaranteed job holders, and potentially could
provide valuable public services including many that reduce social and environmental costs. As Minsky
put it, "only an infinitely elastic demand for labor can guarantee full employment without setting off a
wage-price spiral, and only government can create an infinitely elastic demand for labor" (Minsky 1986).
At the same time, as long as those holding a guaranteed job are available when private sector demand
increases, then such a program would not result in inflationary pressures or structural rigidities.
There will surely be many objections to a program of public service guaranteed jobs. These will
undoubtedly include the following: Will this public service job opportunity program be another make-work
New Deal WPA? If such a program is instituted, can it be efficiently administered? States are already
implementing welfare-to-work programs, why is this program needed? Won't participation in such a
program lead to stigmatization? And finally, why worry now, when unemployment is at the lowest level it
has been for a generation. 
Proponents of the public service guaranteed jobs program would easily respond to these. First, they
would cite the numerous WPA achievements that enhanced the country's physical infrastructure, the
artistic and educational accomplishments, and most importantly, the opportunity the WPA gave to
millions of people to productively contribute to the American economy and society (Minsky 1986).
Second, they would enumerate the plethora of needed but unfilled jobs, i.e., teachers assistants, library
and day care assistants, companions to senior citizens, the bedridden and mentally and physically
impaired, neighborhood that highway clean-up, environmental safety monitors, and many more that this
program can help fill. Third, given the abuses of some public programs, the concern of efficiently
administering a public service guaranteed jobs program is legitimate, but there are some model
programs, i.e., VISTA, the Peace Corps, or Americorps that could be modified to administer it with
minimum costs. Fourth, state after state, with only a few exceptions, have indicated that they will not
offer permanent work to prior welfare recipients leaving them to fend for themselves. Fifth, given the
experience and the enthusiasm of participants in the Peace Corps, VISTA and Americorps, a public
service work assignment may be a good entry in the resume. Finally, as I argued earlier, a closer look at
the official unemployment measurements does not show a "worker heaven." 
What Is to Be Done?
The costs of unemployment are significant and many of them can be quantified, especially those
associated with the loss of output that unemployed workers could have produced. Furthermore, those
who are working (and their employers) are burdened with financing unemployment insurance and other
maintenance support that the unemployed receive. Alas, the "damages" of unemployment do not stop
with these. There are many other negative effects (Sen 1997) that inflict the unemployed, including loss
of freedom and social exclusion, poor health and mortality, discouragement and loss of motivation for
future work, weakening of family structure, racial and gender intolerance, cynicism and ultimate loss of
social values and self-reliance, and psychological suffering, mental agony and even suicide.
Unemployment also breeds resistance to organizational flexibility and promotes technical conservatism
from those currently employed who fear downsizing and joblessness.
The realized costs and negative effects of unemployment are undoubtedly much higher in Europe than in
America, although it is difficult to discern if this is so from the official statistics. Yet, the absence in
the Maastricht Treaty (which provides the process of implementing a single European currency and
includes specific resolutions to reduce inflation and budget deficits) of any requirement for an all-round
unemployment rate is disturbing. Even in the United States an articulated commitment of employment
targets, enumerated in the Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, has been
affirmed by each successive political establishment. But the real issue is not to discover each
continent's or country's skeletons in the closet rather, it is whether policymakers are willing to learn the
lessons of successful (and failed) policies of the past, amend them to reflect current economic
conditions, and to finally marshall the needed resources to implement them. 
William Vickrey, in his AEA presidential address in 1993 ended with these sentences: "There is no reasoninherent in the real resources available to us why we cannot move rapidly within the next two or three
years to a state of genuinely full employment and then continue indefinitely at that level. We should then
enjoy a major reduction in the ills of poverty, homelessness, sickness and crime that this would entail.
We might also see less resistance to reductions of military expenditure, to liberalization of trade and
migration policy, and to conservation and environmental protection programs." Should this be "Today's
Task" for economists? I think so, I hope so.
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